Research Archive

© Review of Financial Studies, 2000
Volume: 13 | Issue: 4 | Pages: 1057-99

Publication type: Journal article

Research Archive Topic: Corporate Finance

Abstract

The valuation of debt and equity, reorganization boundaries, and firm's optimal dividend policies are studied in a framework where we model strategic interactions between debt holders and equity holders in a game-theoretic setting which can accommodate varying bargaining powers to the two claimants. Two formulations of reorganization are presented: debt-equity swaps and strategic debt service resulting from negotiated debt service reductions. We study the effects of bond covenants on payout policies and distinguish liquidity-induced defaults from strategic defaults. We derive optimal equity issuance and payout policies. The debt capacity of the firm and the optimal capital structure are characterized.

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