"Tipping Climate Negotiations"
Climate Change and Common Sense: Essays in Honour of Tom Schelling
Editor(s): Robert Hahn and Alastair Ulph
© Oxford University Press, January 2012
Publication type: Chapter
We investigate whether progress towards an international treaty on greenhouse gas emissions could benefit from insights about tipping a non-cooperative game from an inefficient to an efficient equilibrium. Games with increasing differences have multiple equilibria and have a “tipping set,” a subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do the same. We argue that international climate negotiations form such a game and so have a tipping set. This can provide a novel perspective on finding a way forward in climate negotiations.
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