"Conflicts of Interest, Low-Quality Ratings, and Meaningful Reform of Credit and Corporate Governance Ratings"
©
e21,
April
2010
Publication type: Web-only article
Research Archive Topic: Business Economics and Public Policy, Corporate Finance
Abstract
Policymakers and academic critics have identified "conflicts of interest" in the rating industry that have led to poor ratings quality, harming investors who purchase over- or mis-rated investments. We address the question of whether conflicts of interest can arise in the ratings industry without the monopoly benefit conferred by regulatory licenses like those given credit rating agencies that operate as Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSRO). We show that incentive conflicts are apparent in the corporate governance rating industry, despite the lack of a formal regulatory role for the agencies.
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