"Optimal Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Costly Monitoring"
Working Paper No. FBE 36-09,
Publication type: Working paper
We introduce a tractable dynamic monitoring technology into a repeated moral-hazard problem, and we study the optimal long-term contract between principal and agent. Monitoring adds value by allowing the principal to reduce the intensity of performance-based incentives, reducing the likelihood of costly termination. Termination happens in equilibrium only if its costs are relatively low. Optimal monitoring intensity may decline as performance deteriorates because an agent with a smaller inside stake has less to lose. In general, the intensity of both monitoring and performance-based compensation can be non-monotonic functions of the quality of past performance. Our results can also help explain puzzling empirical findings on the relationship between performance history and future pay-performance sensitivity and on the linkage between termination, performance, and monitoring.
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